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INTRODUCTION
It is increasingly recognized by states that the accountability of public authorities is a key component of environmental protection efforts. The development of environmental law, as enshrined by the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development 1 and the Convention on 90/313/EEC on the Freedom of Access to Information on the Environment. 8 The EU continued to play a vital role in the negotiations leading to the creation of the Aarhus Convention, which is the keystone instrument that enshrines the right of access to environmental information at the international level. Based on Western liberal-democratic values and described as a regional convention with global scope, 9 the Aarhus Convention obliges states to guarantee the right of access to environmental information held by public authorities, subject to various exceptions, by linking environmental and human rights. 10 The
Convention's procedural rights entrench the right of access to environmental information within states that are Parties to the Convention, and had a significant influence on how states conceptualize the right in their respective environmental information regimes.
It is under the auspices of the Aarhus Convention that both the United Kingdom (UK) and
China have guaranteed the right of access to environmental information. However, the relationship between the Aarhus Convention and these two jurisdictions differs greatly. The However, while both sets of instruments are substantively identical the context in which they operate in is not. This can be seen in the provision of public utilities, in particular water and sewerage services, which is privatized in England and Wales but not in Scotland or Northern
Ireland. This is significant, as these differences can lead to the regulations having different scopes in each constituent country in the UK, depending on the degree of control the state has over public utilities in each country. In order to recognise the impact of these differences and provide a coherent comparative analysis, the article will focus its analysis on the EIR and its implementation in England and Wales. 12 In contrast to the UK, China is not a Party to the Aarhus Convention and is not bound to implement the Convention's approach when guaranteeing the right. Nevertheless, China has broadly adopted the principles of the Aarhus Convention in guaranteeing the right of access to environmental information 13 and there is ongoing academic debate on whether China should become a Party to the Convention. 14 Thus, regardless of whether states have acceded to the Convention or merely draw inspiration from it, the overarching framework provided by 12 For the purposes of narrative clarity throughout the article, the jurisdiction of England and Wales will be shortened to England. 13 As will be demonstrated below, there are shortcomings in the rules governing access to environmental information in both England and China when measured against the standards in the Aarhus Convention. These shortcomings have significant impact on how the right operates in practice. This article focuses on two particular aspects of the environmental information regimes in England and China that lead to deficiencies in application of the right.
Firstly, it discusses the definitional implications of 'public authority' and 'Government department' and, secondly, it reviews the circumstances in which public authorities may withhold information from disclosure. The article contends that legal transplant theory can assist in remedying the observed shortcomings that are associated with these two aspects.
Legal transplant theory helps to make sense of the nature of law and its connection to the needs of society, 16 and is appropriate for application in this context as it provides a lens through which to view legal reforms and gauge their likelihood of being successfully adopted.
This article seeks to highlight both the similarities and the differences between the two jurisdictions in how they approach selected aspects of the right of access to environmental information and their success in guaranteeing the right when judged against the standards of the Aarhus Convention. By highlighting the similarities and differences between the two jurisdictions and as against the Convention, the article aims to: (a) identify the different approaches that England and China have adopted in the context of the normative framework information is exempt from disclosure. These aspects of the regime were selected because they best represent the differences between English and Chinese conceptualizations and approaches towards guaranteeing the right of access to environmental information. Legal reforms sourced from each jurisdiction are then proposed and the likelihood of the proposed transplants being successfully adopted into the receiving legal system is explored. The article concludes that it is theoretically possible for England and China to look to each other as sources of legal reform to improve how the right is guaranteed, which would have a wider positive impact on environmental democracy. However, the article concedes that the cultural and political barriers between these states will likely hinder the sourcing and adoption of the proposed transplants.
LEGAL TRANSPLANT THEORY
Law shows us many paradoxes. Perhaps the strangest of all is that, on the one hand, a people's law can be regarded as being special to it, indeed a sign of that people's identity… [Yet] on the other hand, legal transplants -the moving of a rule or a system of law from one country to another, or from one people to another -have been common since the earliest recorded history. 17 It is commonly accepted that the laws in a jurisdiction mirror the unique needs of that jurisdiction, 18 a theory referred to in this article as the 'mirror theory.' Originating from the legal studies of Montesquieu, the mirror theory denotes the importance of society within the local law-making process and precludes the possibility of laws travelling between jurisdictions. 19 When viewing the law through this theoretical lens, a reasonable assumption is that because the specific needs of a society differ in different states due to natural, political and legal factors, the laws of one jurisdiction cannot fit the different needs of another. 27 allowing the 'legal elite' to build on the experience of the donor jurisdiction and prevent costly errors arising from the implementation of unsuitable laws. 28 Additionally, the desire to increase the legitimacy of the state at the domestic and international level through incorporating internationally recognized legal norms into domestic law 29 has been identified as a key reason for jurisdictions to look beyond their own borders for legal reforms. This is of particular importance in the context of the right of access to environmental information because the Aarhus Convention acts as the normative international instrument in this area.
Any domestic environmental information regime which complies with the Convention is seen to be effectively implementing the right of access to environmental information.
However, the process of looking towards other jurisdictions to source legal reforms is easier said than done and raises a plethora of questions that the 'legal elite' must answer: firstly, how will the jurisdiction source these reforms; secondly, are the selected transplants likely to be successfully adopted And; thirdly, will there be unintended consequences? In addressing the first two questions, Watson identifies three conditions which must be met for the legal transplant to be adopted successfully: the laws being transplanted must be accessible to the Finally, states may attach particular importance to the question of unintended consequences.
These consequences are not merely the potential rejection of the proposed transplant. Legal transplants may also act to transform the legal system in which they have been transplanted, thereby altering characteristics of the receiving system to reflect the legal system of the donor State. 40 The transformative impact of legal transplants can be substantial, because they can subtly introduce legal principles into a jurisdiction that would normally dismiss such principles outright. This can be seen to some extent in China's implementation of the right of access to environmental information, which has incorporated Western ideals of transparency into the traditionally closed-off system of Chinese governance. However, it must be noted that the receiving jurisdiction is not obliged to transplant the proposed reform in full; it can certainly amend the provisions of the original law to fit within its own legal system. 41 In doing so, it is possible for the receiving jurisdiction to minimize the transformative impact of the legal transplant.
APPLYING LEGAL TRANSPLANT THEORY TO THE ENVIRONMENTAL INFORMATION REGIMES IN ENGLAND AND CHINA

The Aarhus Convention and the Right of Access to Environmental Information in
England and China
The Aarhus Convention, as the keystone of the right of access to environmental information, is vital to setting the minimum procedural standards 42 European principles underpinning environmental law into China's legal system. In this way, the EU plays an influential role in how the right is guaranteed in these jurisdictions.
It is within the frameworks of the Aarhus Convention and the EU that England and China have created domestic regimes to guarantee the right of access to environmental information.
In England, the right is implemented through the EIR regime and in China through the
Regulations of the People's Republic of China on Open Government Information 2007 (OGI) and the Measures on Open Environmental Information 2007 (MOEI). Both regimes have
adopted the same overall structure: they each provide a right of access to environmental information held by the state, which is triggered when a request for information is submitted to a public authority. On receiving a request for environmental information the public authority is obliged to decide, subject to various procedural obligations, whether to disclose 45 Art. 9. 46 European Commission, 'EU-China Environmental Governance Programme', available at: http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/projects/eu-china-environmental-governance-programme_en.
the requested information or whether to rely on an exemption and withhold disclosure. If the public authority decides to withhold the requested information, or if in reaching their decision they breach procedural obligations, individuals can seek to have the decision reviewed and, if successful, avail themselves of the remedies provided by the review body.
While both regimes have adopted a similar structure to guarantee the right, there are significant differences in their regulatory frameworks. One difference is that the EIR regime These differences are important because they influence the content of the domestic environmental information regimes in both jurisdictions. Indeed the differences between jurisdictions and their laws shapes the legal transplant process. Nonetheless, despite these differences it is important to note that both jurisdictions adopt the structure of the Aarhus Convention in establishing a framework for their environmental information regimes. This is important from the perspective of legal transplant theory, as the similarities in the structure of both regimes make it easier for the proposed legal transplants to be incorporated without being substantially altered. However, the analysis also indicates various parallels between the Chinese and English regimes which, in turn, can act as sources of inspiration for legal transplants. England could remedy the ambiguities in defining private entities that provide public services as public authorities, by looking to the broad definition used in China which encapsulates all entities performing public functions. This would eliminate the uncertainty in determining whether a private entity providing a public service is, for the purposes of the EIR, a public authority.
Public Authorities and Government
Moreover, it could do so without requiring applicants, who generally do not have legal training, to apply the 'special powers' test. This makes it easier for applicants to submit requests under the regime and broadens the accessibility of the right. However, in practice, adopting this transplant may be difficult because England lacks the degree of state control that China has over the provision of public utilities 73 which makes such a broad definition possible. Notwithstanding this potential obstacle, it must be noted that the Chinese definition of government departments matches the broad scope of the Aarhus Convention whereby the structure of public utilities does not absolve the state of its obligation to provide access to 70 Ibid. 71 environmental information. 74 The ideological convergence between the Aarhus Convention and Chinese law adds a degree of legitimacy to the Chinese provisions, and may act to surmount the difficulties raised by the different structures of public utilities and make the proposed transplant more feasible.
Conversely it would also be difficult for China to look to and adopt a specific provision in the English EIR regime as a means of legal reform. This is not because of the text of the OGI and to take action in order to hold the state to account, 75 the introduction of the OGI and MOEI regime can be said to have precipitated a cultural change as well. This cultural shift may act to push the CCP into adopting this proposed transplant, despite this counteracting its interests as China's 'legal elite.'
Exceptions and Exemptions to the Right of Access to Environmental Information in England and China
A key element of the Aarhus Convention, Directive 2003/4/EC, and the domestic environmental information regimes of England and China, is the ability of public authorities to refuse requests for access in certain circumstances. This is important because, while states do hold information in the public interest, public authorities need to be able to withhold sensitive information that may cause harm if disclosed. At the international level, the Aarhus Convention sets out two categories of information that are exempt from the obligation of disclosure on request. The first category is general in nature and concerns whether the authority holds the information; 76 whether the information is in the course of completion or constitutes an internal communication; 77 and whether the request is 'manifestly unreasonable' or too general. 78 The second category protects a range of specific interests that can be adversely affected by the disclosure of sensitive information. These interests are broad, ranging from international relations, national security, public security 79 and the privacy rights of individuals. 80 Requests for environmental information can also be refused under this category if it relates to confidentiality of commercial or industrial information, when such protection is granted by law, 81 and if the disclosure of the requested information would impair environmental protection efforts. 82 Directive 2003/4/EC follows a similar division of exceptions and protects an identical set of interests.
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In addition to setting the scope of the exceptions themselves, the Aarhus Convention and Directive 2003/4/EC place limits on how they can be used. Under both instruments, public authorities are obliged to interpret exceptions restrictively and must disclose the information if the public interest in withholding the information from disclosure is outweighed by the public interest in having the requested information released. 84 Furthermore, the exceptions operate under a presumption of disclosure, 85 which further increases the likelihood of the requested environmental information being disclosed. These conditions prevent public authorities from unduly withholding sensitive information to hide wrongdoing, and play an important role in ensuring that the right of access to environmental information is effectively guaranteed.
In implementing the exceptions enshrined in the Aarhus Convention, England has directly transposed the text of the Convention and Directive 2003/4/EC into the EIR regime. 86 The interests protected by the EIR 87 mirror those found in these instruments. The EIR exceptions also operate under a presumption of disclosure 88 similar to that articulated in the Aarhus Convention and Directive 2003/4/EC. This presumption works alongside the public interest test, which states that a refusal based on one of the exceptions can be overruled if it is in the public interest for the requested information to be disclosed. 89 The public interest test acts as an additional safeguard in the public authority's determination on whether to disclose or withhold the requested information, where the public authority must weigh the considerations for disclosing and withholding the requested information. 90 In applying the public interest test, the public authority can take into account the promotion of participation in environmental matters; the free exchange of views and a greater awareness of environmental issues. 91 Additionally, public authorities can aggregate the weight of the exceptions in deciding whether or not to disclose the requested environmental information. 92 While this does have the potential to undermine the restrictive interpretation of the exceptions promoted by the Aarhus Convention, 93 in practice overlapping interests are discounted from the aggregation process 94 and the general approach of considering the weight each individual interest should be accorded 95 limits the impact of this power. In obliging public authorities to follow these steps, the EIR regime is predisposed towards disclosing the requested information, following the aims of the Aarhus Convention. This predisposition is arguably to be expected, considering the shared Western liberal background of the UK and the Aarhus Convention.
However, despite strict adherence to the text of the Convention, England has had mixed success to date in effectively implementing the exceptions. For example, in applying the exception relating to relating to international relations, defence, national security or public safety, 96 the EIR grants public authorities the discretion to neither confirm nor deny holding the information when responding to a request for access. 97 This is justified on the basis that, in certain instances, even revealing the existence of the requested information is akin to disclosing it and can have a negative impact on the public interest. Notwithstanding the strength of this justification, the power to neither confirm nor deny is not mentioned in the Aarhus Convention or Directive 2003/4/EC and, in fact, contradicts the obligation to reason refusals. 98 The English approach breaches both the letter and spirit of the Aarhus Convention because if such a response is issued by the public authority the applicant will not know the basis for the refusal. Consequently, the applicant will be unable to make an informed decision as to the prospects of having the decision reviewed, which undermines their ability to enforce their right of access to environmental information.
In addition to this, the implementation of the exception relating to the secrecy of commercial and industrial information has been problematic. Under the provisions of the EIR, information relating to commercial or trade secrets can be withheld from disclosure if it protects a legitimate economic interest and the information is designated as confidential by law. 99 The designation of confidentiality can be done through both statute and case law, 100 but if it is granted through case law then the information must be imparted to the public authority 'in circumstances importing an obligation of confidence.' 101 This means that information that is created between a public authority and a private body does not fall within the exception because it cannot be said to have been 'imparted.' This has a mixed impact on the right: while it does ensure that public authorities are fully transparent in their dealings with private bodies, private bodies are less likely to share information with public authorities if there is a risk of the information being disclosed to the public. China can also benefit from looking towards England to seek legal reforms. One particular set of transplants that China should consider incorporating is the English public interest test and the presumption of disclosure into the OGI and MOEI regime. By adopting these procedures into its environmental information regime, China would redress the discretionary powers available to government departments that weight the request process towards nondisclosure. In turn, this would provide a more robust and effective means for citizens to utilize their right of access to environmental information. However, while these proposed transplants would help China to fully operationalize the right of access to environmental information, they also conflict with the CCP's aim of maintaining control over the flow of information. To an extent, the two aims oppose each other and cannot coexist within the same legal system. This, however, ignores the ultimate objective of maintaining control over the flow of information: to continue to improve the legitimacy of the CCP at the domestic and international level. The latter aim may ultimately trump the former and narrower aim of controlling the flow of information due to the change in how China's citizens and Chinese environmental non-government organizations (NGOs), wish to be engaged in environmental protection efforts. 127 If the CCP cannot respond to this increased desire on the part of China's citizens to access environmental information held by the State, then it is probable that they will lose some of their domestic legitimacy as the ruling party. Indeed, it is likely that, if this transplant were proposed, it would be on the initiative of Chinese environmental NGOs which, according to some commentators, play an increasingly important, albeit still limited, role in influencing decisions made by the CCP. 128 Additionally, in order to not be seen as acting contrary to the generally accepted norms of the Aarhus Convention, China may be pressured by the international community to adopt these transplants. Hence, despite the tension between certain aims of the CCP and the proposed transplant, if proposed, China might consider adopting it into its current environmental information regime.
It is particularly interesting to contrast this with any proposed transplant relating to the 'social stability' exemption contained within the OGI and MOEI. One clear point is that neither the Aarhus Convention nor the EIR regime contains such a broad exemption, and that the use of this exemption in China provides more opportunity for Chinese government departments to withhold environmental information in comparison to their Western counterparts. As such, a potential reform that could be adopted by China is to abolish the exemption. While this is not a transplant as defined by Watson, which requires that a law be placed into the receiving jurisdiction to be defined as a transplant, 129 the reform encounters the encounters the same clash of values as transplanting the presumption of disclosure and the public interest test.
However, this provision in the OGI and MOEI can be distinguished from the previously identified issues. This distinction arises from the fact that the social stability exemption epitomizes a fundamental aspect of the Marxist form of socialist government. 130 This lends a degree of cultural significance to the exemption that is lacking in the procedural elements of the public interest test and presumption of disclosure. Consequently, because it is intrinsically connected to the political and social fabric of China, the CCP is unlikely to abolish the 'social stability' exemption to match the Western values enshrined by the Aarhus Convention, even if such a reform would better guarantee the right of access to environmental information.
CONCLUSION
The right of access to environmental information plays a key role in modern environmental governance. It empowers citizens to act as stewards for the environment, allowing them to actively participate in environmental decision-making procedures, act as enforcers for environmental regulations, and protest against environmental harms caused by the state.
However, in order for the right to be effectively guaranteed it must be implemented with a set of procedural rights that govern which bodies are within the scope of the right and how public authorities process and determine information requests. Enshrined in the Aarhus Convention, 
